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TOPIC 8.  INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE UNION  . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . .  34 TOPIC 1  I  CHALLENGES, PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES 
A.  Basic points 
Reasons for reform: tlhe challenges facing Europe 
- In addition to the explicit reasons set out in the TEU itself, which relate to completion of 
the Maastricht venture, and the commitments subsequently entered into by both the 
Council and the European Council in connection with the most recent enlargement and 
with a view to the  nc~xt, there are also implicit reasons for holding the 
1996 lntergovernmontal Conference which the Reflection Group has been instructed to 
prepare.  The Group has identified two fundamental reasons, namely improving the 
functioning of the Union and equipping it with the means to cope with the internal and 
external challenge:s facing it, such as the next enlargement. 
- A key challenge facing the Union internally is the need to ensure that European 
construction becomes a venture to which its citizens can relate.  The growing popular 
dissatisfaction with public matters in general and European construction in particular is 
partly due to economic, political and institutional reasons: a high level of unemployment, 
which is particularly serious in the case of young people and the long-term unemployed, 
social rejection and exclusion, the crisis in relations between representatives and those 
represented, the European Union's growing complexity and the lack of information on, and 
understanding of,  its raison d'etre, as well as worrying developments in organized crime 
(drug trafficking, mc·ney laundering, terrorism) which are prompting a growing call for 
public security, that cannot be met by States acting alone, and is likewise receiving no 
satisfactory respom:e from the Union because of the gaps or shortcomings in its 
mechanisms. 
- There are also major challenges resulting from the profound changes taking place 
outside the Union as the end of the century approaches: major political instability in 
the European region following the end of the cold war, major migrations of populations 
which are particularly acute in Europe, risks of ecological imbalances which the Union cannot afford to ignore, etc., coupled with an increasing globalization of 
the economy which highlights Europe's loss of some of the comparative historical 
advantages gained through its social and technological innovations, and which can only 
be met by adopting an equally global approach. 
The responses 
- The new internal and external context in  Europe calls for responses that will ensure 
greater political stability while simultaneously allowing economic development and a social 
climate of solidarity to be safeguarded within an open, global and competitive economy, in 
other words responses that will put the European Union in a position to continue acting as 
the principal factor of peace and prosperity on the European continent. 
- Europe's responses to the above challenges have already been partly determined, as in 
the case of economic and monetary union (although some members of the Group see a 
case for adjusting ttle balance between social and economic aspects on the one hand and 
monetary aspects on the other, without however altering the original timetable and 
convergence criteria) or of the next enlargement, which will present its own challenges. 
As stated above, otller responses have already been formulated either by the Treaty itself 
or by subsequent European Councils; it is the Reflection Group, however, that has been 
tasked with working out their details and giving them concrete form.  The Group's initial 
analysis led to the following conclusions: 
*  If, as stated above, the Union's principal internal challenge is to reconcile itself with its 
citizens, enhancing its legitimacy in their eyes will have to be the prime objective of the 
coming reform. 
Achieving this go::>al will require a clear definition of the Union's objectives, i.e. the joint 
goals sought, ensuring the credibility of policies and/or the cooperation machinery 
designed to attain those objectives (or, to put it another way, adapting the instruments 
with a view to reaching the objectives set) and preserving the Union's internal 
cohesion.  The Group has come to the conclusion that the coming reform must give 
priority to the "re,al" problems, i.e. those which preoccupy Europeans most.  A majority 
of personal repr•3sentatives .. 
.. 
include unemplcJyment, internal security and environmental degradation among 
the problems to be tackled as a matter of immediate urgency. 
A further response to the challenge posed by citizens' alienation from the Union would 
be a correct and  systematic application of the principles of efficiency, democracy, 
transparency and solidarity to relations between the Union's Institutions and 
between its Member States, and also between the Member States and the Institutions. 
Those principles should be put into practice through concrete measures, such as 
improved application of the subsidiarity principle ("who does what?"); simplification (of 
texts and procedures); bolstering the rights of the Union's citizens; greater political 
responsibility for  the Institutions combined with increased accountability on their part, 
with national parliaments assuming a more prominent role in this connection; and 
greater transparency in the functioning of the Institutions, which should be given the 
means to take decisions with the broadest possible backing from citizens.  The 
machinery desi9ned to preserve the Union's internal cohesion also needs to be 
adapted and stmngthened, this step being particularly important with a view to the 
next enlargement. 
The responses to the challenges posed by the profound changes which have taken 
place outside t~1e Union, in the political and security context as well as in the 
economic and C(>mmercial sphere, need to be based on reinforcement of the 
instruments set up to achieve the highest possible levels of external stability and 
security.  The key task here, therefore, is to take all the steps necessary to provide 
the Union with a genuine external identity that will enable it to become a world force in 
international re[ations, so that it can promote its values, defend its interests and help 
shape a new world order.  This will clearly only be possible if the Foreign Policy really 
functions, with full consistency being ensured between the political and economic 
aspects of the Union's external action.  To cope with the new challenges that have 
arisen with regard to security in Europe, it is also necessary to face up to the question 
of whether the Union should provide itself with a real common defence policy. 
The next enlarg1ement represents both a moral imperative and a major opportunity for 
Europe.  At the !;arne time, however, it presents the Union 
with a major chc:dlenge requiring an adequate response both at the Intergovernmental Conference itself, through the reforms designed to improve the 
Union's functioning in general and institutional reform in particular, and in the margins 
of that Conference, in view of the impact which enlargement will have on applicant 
countries and on the Union's policies.  The next enlargement will be different from the 
previous ones because of the large number of applicant countries and the 
heterogeneity of their political, economic and social situations.  To ensure that the next 
enlargement doHs not weaken or actually break up the Union, the changes needed to 
cope with the challenge involved must first be made.  Sure though they may be, the 
benefits derivin~1 from enlargement cannot be reaped until the 1996 Conference has 
been concluded satisfactorily.  The success of the former thus depends on the 
success of the latter. 
Principles and objectives 
- The Group unanimously emphasizes the need to continue and strengther European 
integration in this nE!W end-of-the-century context.  Preservation of a common core formed 
by the principles and objectives of the Union, the single institutional framework and 
the "acquis communautaire", which characterize the European Community as an entity 
based on the rule ol' law, represent the principal guarantee of peace and prosperity for the 
citizens of the Union.  The Group emphasizes that this peace guarantee is not perpetual 
and that it would be a grave error to underestimate the Community's main contribution to 
the Member States and their citizens, namely a shared view of life that has ruled out war 
as a means of settling differences.  The Group accordingly feels that the Conference must 
endorse and reinforce the Union's common principles and objectives, i.e. peace and 
freedom, internal and external security and prosperity for Europeans and solidarity 
between them. 
Scope of the Conference 
- The Group considers that the Conference should formulate adequate responses to the 
above challenges, including the changes necessary to accommodate all applicants for 
enlargement, in respect of both institutional matters and appropriate development of the 
Union's internal and external security. 
- The scope of the Conference should therefore be such as is needed for the above goals 
to be achieved, wit~1out prejudice to the steps already completed towards the construction of Europe.  The process should be unique: it must not prejudge any 
predetermined politico-legal format or constantly shifting objectives, but adapt them as 
and when needed. 
- The Group further favours comprehensive treatment of all issues as part of a single 
exercise.  A single c:onference not split into different stages seems the most appropriate 
method of removing  uncertainties regarding the future and avoiding any r;sk of excessive 
prolongation of an e·xercise that virtually amounts to a constituent procedure. 
- The Group also emphasizes that all the reforms needed can be tackled partly by 
amending the  treatif:~s and partly also by improving the Union's procedures and working 
methods. 
Context and timetable· 
- The Conference forms part of a broader context including, inter alia: (1) enlargement; 
(2) transition to the third stage of EMU; (3) renegotiation of the own resources system and 
the financial perspective for 1999 and beyond; (4) analysis of the impact of enlargement 
on policies and resources; (5) debate on a future common defence policy, and on 
the WEU in connection with the 1998 deadline.  It should also be remembered that 
elections are due to be held in various Member States in the course of 1997 and 1998. 
All the above elements are linked in some way to the reform of the Union; it will therefore 
be necessary to consider the relationship between them.  This matter will be broached as 
part of the examination of the various topics; however, it is worth noting the political value 
of making a compmhensive examination of all the above aspects. 
Flexibility and coherence of the Union 
- The prospect of enlargement, combined with the fact that the Union already operates 
differentiated integration arrangements in those areas where this is allowed, prompts the 
question whether, and to what extent, any flexibility is possible, a question that will also 
affect the outcome of the Conference and the approach to be adopted to enlargement. 
- As stated above, some members want the Group to give an unequivocal answer to the 
question "What do we want to accomplish together?".  That answer will clarify what the 
reform is expected 10 achieve. 
1 It should not be possible for those who want and even need to progress to be held back 
by those who do not wish to do so.  At the same time, however, it will be necessary to 
consider what should be the limits to the flexibility that will make it possible to manage 
diversity without jeopardizing the acquis and the common objectives. 
Outcome of the Confe1rence 
- The Group has not ·~et paused to analyze the consequences of or the possible solutions 
for a possible scenario in which some Member State fails to ratify the reform. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Does the Group consider it necessary to give further consideration to the replies 
contained in  its report to the challenges facing Europe at the end of the century and the 
guidelines for strennthening the principles and objectives of the Union? 
- Does it seem appropriate to proceed with a general review of the various components of 
the European agenda between now and the end of the century and establish guidelines 
for its management? 
- It would appear to be necessary to give further thought to the Group's reply on flexibility 
and its limits.  SincE· everyone appears to reject an a  Ia carte Europe, what are the other 
possible arrangements?  As regards the limits to flexibility, the following have been 
mentioned: flexibility should be introduced when all other solutions have been exhausted; 
no-one who so desires and fulfils conditions previously adopted unanimously should be 
excluded from involvement in a given action or common policy; provision should be made 
for accompanying measures for those who want to but are temporarily unable to take part 
in a given action or policy; the entire acquis should be maintained and a minimum 
common basis should be preserved to prevent any sort of retreat from common principles 
and objectives; there should be a single institutional framework.  Does the Group believe 
that these are basically the limits to flexibility? 
- Can a crisis scenario be envisaged for the Conference?  If so, should the Group provide 
possible alternative solutions, for example introducing changes in the ratification process? TOPIC 2.  THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM: PART 1.  THE INSTITUTIONAL 
BALANCE 
A.  Basic points 
- The institutions are not an end in themselves but an instrument serving the Union's 
objectives. 
- Ways must be foun1j of increasing citizens' confidence in the European institutions, the 
reform of which must be subjected to the test of more democracy, more efficiency, 
more solidarity and more transparency (the last cannot be achieved by greater 
accessibility and publicity alone; there must be greater simplicity and clarity in the 
allocation of functions: "who does what"). 
- The Group believes that institutional reform must involve retaining the single institutional 
framework.  Only in that way will it be possible to consider flexible formulae for the 
gradual achievement of common objectives. 
- It is also necessary that reform respect the institutional balance as a whole, in 
accordance with thE! unique nature of the European Union.  That must not prevent the 
institutions' adaptinu to new circumstances and requirements or the strengthening of 
some of them- provided such strengthening does not operate to the disadvantage of the 
others - or better dnfinition of their relative functions for the sake of greater transparency. 
- With the prospect of imminent enlargement institutional reform can no longer be 
postponed.  One ol' the major challenges of future enlargement will be in the area of the 
institutions.  The stronger and more efficient the Union i.1stitutions are and the more 
support they receivn from our citizens, the greater the benefits of all sorts that will derive 
from the  forthcomin·~ enlargement.  Inadequate or insufficient institutional reform, on the 
other hand, will jeopardize the very process of the construction of Europe. 
- Languages: The richness of the Union's cultural diversity, transparency and greater 
participation by national parliaments and citizens, and the legal security of 
q a Community of the rule of law require strict observance of equal treatment for the Union's 
official languages on the part of the institutions.  This behaviour obligation  requires no 
amendment of the Treaties. 
- p.m. Structure of the Treaty (see Topics 5 and 6) 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Without questioning the criteria of convergence or the timetable for a sirgle currency, 
some members point to a lack of synchronization between the institutional development of 
the monetary aspect of EMU and the- insufficient- institutionalization of its economic 
and social aspect.  Do we believe that the Group should examine this point in greater 
depth? 
(() TOPIC 3.  THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM: PART 2.  THE INSTITUTIONS 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
A.  Basic points 
- Composition: It would appear to be relevant to fix  a maximum number of seats, which 
some have set at 700 members in an enlarged Union, as the European Parliament 
mentions in its report. 
- Uniform electoral procedure: The Treaty already provides the legal basis for such a 
procedure in Article 138(3).  Some members consider it desirable to achieve that 
uniformity as soon as possible. 
- Legislation: 
The EP's legislativ'e initiative: it is felt that the right of invitation established in 
Article 138b is sufficient. 
Legislative procedures: There is a large majority in favour of their simplification, reducing 
them to three in number: consultation, co-decision and assent.  There is no agreement 
on the scope of co-decision: some wish to apply it, in principle, to those legislative 
decisions which the Council takes by a qualified majority.  Others prefer to adopt a 
case-by-case approach. And, finally, a member  does not see any reason to a further 
increase of the powers of the European Parliament. In any case, the Group feels it would 
be appropriate to simplify the co-decision procedure. 
- Budgetary function: See Topic 8, Resources. 
- Political control: As regards the role of the EP in the appointment of the Commission, 
some members feel that the present system is adequate.  Others prefer the EP to elect 
the President of the Commission from a list proposed by the Council.  As regards political 
control of the Commission, see under Commission. 
I ( - Executive control: Some members consider it appropriate to increase the EP's and the 
Mediator's powers to combat fraud. 
- Role of the EP under Titles V and VI: See under CFSC (Topic 6) and European 
Citizenship (Topic 5). 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Study the guidelines for the simplification of the co-decision procedure. 
- Study the scope for co-decision in greater depth. 
- Examine the  Europ1~an Parliament's powers of political and executive control in greater 
depth, with special reference to combating fraud (in practice, it would be useful to 
measure the extent of agreement within the Group on the latter point). 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
A.  Basic points 
- Agreement on the need to increase each national parliament's control over its government 
in  Union affairs.  Collaboration will be required not only from each government but also 
from the Community institutions (languages, prior information, deadlines). 
- Agreement that no second chamber should be created. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Explore formulae for the association of national parliaments with the Community 
institutions.  Study the possibility of expanding Declarations 13 and 14 on the Treaty. 
Examine in greater detail ways of simplifying each national parliament's task of 
supervising Union decisions. 
- Study the proposed creation of a High Consultative Council on subsidiarity composed of 
delegations from national parliaments. 
12-.. 
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL j~ND  THE COUNCIL 
A.  Basic points 
- Agreement on strengthening the role of the Council as an institution with clear legislative 
and executive powe·rs, without prejudice to the institutional balance. 
The European Council 
A.  Basic points 
- Maintenance of the present functions of the European Council, as the Union's main 
source of impulse and political orientation. 
The Council 
A.  Basic points 
- Powers: Maintenance of its present functions, strengthening its ability to act. 
- Decision-taking mochanism: 
*  Unanimity or qualified majority?  There is consensus within the Group in favour of 
maintaining unanimity for the amendment of primary legislation: Articles Nand 0  and 
other decisions of a "constitutional" nature, such as own resources.  All of those 
require ratification by national parliaments and in some cases the EP's assent is 
required as welL 
As regards decisions on secondary legislation, a majority maintains that the enlarged 
Union would appear to require the extension or even the generalization of the 
qualified majoriity, for reasons of efficiency, in order to prevent the paralysis of the 
enlarged Union when taking decisions; it is also necessitated by the need to reduce 
the discrepancy between the development achieved in the internal market (where 
qualified majorities are the rule) and the lack of development in accompanying policies 
in the social, tax and environment spheres (where basically unanimity is the rule). 
Some members reject this reasoning while others 
IJ * 
* 
accept it, but sea exceptions as warranted in the defence of sensitive interests.  Some 
link the move from unanimity to a qualified majority with better application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and sufficient means. 
Formulas intermediate between unanimity and a qualified majority are 
contemplated for Titles V and VI  (a super-qualified majority, positive abstention, 
consensus less one) and for specially sensitive Community questions.  These 
possibilities must be studied in greater depth. 
Weighting of V()tes for purposes of qualified majorities.  Bearing rn  mind that in 
democratic soci1~ties efficiency is inseparable from legitimacy and that an efficient 
decision is not the one that is the easiest to adopt but the one that receives the most 
support from citizens, some members point to the growing imbalance between the 
population and its representation in votes by qualified majority, the procedure by which 
most Community decisions affecting citizens directly are taken.  In the view of those 
members, the  n1~xt enlargement would create a situation in which, if that imbalance is 
not corrected, a qualified majority could be achieved with a number of votes that could 
even represent a minority of the population.  Those members consider that such a 
situation undermines the efficiency and democracy of Council decisions and is 
unacceptable in the context of future enlargement.  In their view, the system should be 
corrected so that greater account is taken of population by means of new weightings 
for votes, a change in the threshold for qualified majorities or the introduction of a 
double threshold (votes and population).  Other members, on the other hand, do not 
endorse that analysis but rather insist that the weighting of votes in the Council must 
be based more on the principle of the sovereign equality of States than on the 
population factor, which they feel is already adequately reflected in each State's 
representation in the European Parliament.  They also point out that this is a false 
problem, since practice shows that in the Community there is no systematic pattern of 
small-population countries forming coalitions against  the large-population countries, 
and accordingly they do not consider it necessary to alter the present system. 
- The organization of Councils and their methods of work: Regardless of the growing 
imbalance that some allege in the efficiency and legitimacy of the 
1  ~r •  .  . 
voting system, a larqe majority recognizes a gradual decline both in the organization and 
in the methods of work of Councils, which were conceived for a smaller number of 
Member States.  The Group stresses the need for the General Affairs Council to 
re-assume its role of the general coordination of Union affairs and ensure that the 
institution's activitie:; are consistent overall.  In the preparatory phase of decisions, a 
majority of membem see a need for greater consistency between preparatory committees. 
For some members of the Group the enlargement of the Union means that 
reconsideration of tile Council's working methods can no longer be postponed, some 
phases of working 9roup discussion being dropped in favour of a written JJrocedure, on the 
basis of arrangements that will have to be studied in depth. 
_  Publicity: This question was discussed  in topic 4 under the heading concerning 
transparency. For some representatives, the Council should be open to the public 
whenever it works a.s a legislative chamber. Others, on the contrary, point out that an 
excess of transparency can be harmful to efficiency. For these members, more than trying 
to differentiate between the executive and the legislative functions, the prevailing question 
is the intensive and constant negotiation task, which should not be public. Other 
members, finally, specify that  publicity (not so much by the broadcasting of the debates 
as simply by setting up some listening rooms open to interested media) could be restricted 
to the initial debate of presentation of a legislative proposal and to the final moment of 
voting. It would be desirable to explore whether this last idea deserves the support of the 
Group. 
- Presidency: The Group stressed the importance of the Presidency's role in that it was 
responsible for conducting the Union's affairs.  The Group sets great store by the feeling 
of belonging that is encouraged by the system of rotating Presidencies and by the will to 
do better and  the stimulation of those holding the office.  The prospective enlargement 
would result in each country's turn coming round much less frequently, making it 
necessary to establ1sh a system which will ensure greater permanence and visibility for 
the Presidency without making more sporadic the participation by Member States in an 
enlarged Union.  To achieve that the Group has been looking at various arrangements 
that combine elements of permanence and rotation, such as Presidency by teams.  It is 
also considering thE! possibility of electing a President or a High Representative of the 
Union for external policy matters (see Topic 6).  The Group will have to study these 
questions with a view to ensuring the general consistency of institutional functioning. 
IS B.  Areas for reflection 
- Maintenance of unanimity: In which cases?  Should the EP participate when the Council 
decides unanimously?  Under which principles?  In which cases? 
- Scope of qualified majority:  Generalized for secondary Community legislation?  Should 
it be accompanied by co-decision with the EP for legislative decisions?  Is a case-by-case 
approach preferablE! at the present stage of integration and with the prospect of 
enlargement? 
- Weighting of the q1ualified majority:  How can an adequate balance of population and 
votes be ensured in a fashion acceptable to all? 
- Organization of thE! Council:  How can the central role of the General Affairs Council be 
restored?  Creation of a Council of European Affairs composed of deputies to the General 
Affairs Council, with  frequent meetings, so that the General Affairs Council of full 
members receives a reduced agenda which will enable them to deliberate and decide on 
Union affairs? 
- The Council's methods of work:  Study the possibility of applying written procedures in 
the preparatory phases; study arrangements increasing Permanent Representatives 
Committee/Political Committee consistency. 
_  Publicity: Can the Group accept the opening to the public of the Council in the initial and 
final phase of the legislative process?. 
- Study options for exercising the Presidency that solve its operating requirements in an 
enlarged Union. 
THE COMMISSION 
A.  Basic points 
- Powers 
Monopoly of legisl;ative initiative:  The Group is inclined to maintain it, without prejudice 
to the right of invitation as enunciated at present (Articles 138b and 152).  Some 
members, however, suggest mechanisms that amount to limiting it, such as the 
introduction of a "sunset clause" for Commission proposals for legislation. 
1& Another suggests that such a clause should apply not only to proposals but also to the 
rules imposed by Community law.  A large majority considered the latter incompatible with 
a  Community of law,  as general application of such a clause would render law 
ephemeral (the clause would have a "termite effect" on the acquis communautaire).  It 
would have to be studied to see if it would be useful in exceptional cases.  The question 
of the limitation of proposals would have to be examined in depth, bearing in mind the fact 
that the best rule is not necessarily the one that is discussed least. 
Guardian of the  Tr~~aties:  This function of the Commission's was not discussea. 
Executive powers:  The Group was in favour of maintaining the current system of 
powers, in which  th•~ Commission shares the Council's executive powers.  As regards 
committee procedure, the Group is in  favour of finding a solution to simplify procedures, 
but such a solution :annat consist in a straightforward transfer of executive powers to the 
Commission without the Council retaining some supervisory power. 
For allocation of ta:sks in Titles V and VI, see topics 5 and 6. 
- Composition and clecision-making system of the College 
The Group has identified two possible formulae to avoid confrontation between States, 
depending on their :;ize and population, which may pass the test of greater democracy, 
efficiency and transparency, especially with regard to enlargement: one is to retain the 
current system laid down in Article 157(1 ), which states that the Commission must 
include: "at least one national of each of the Member States, but may not include more 
than two Members l1aving the nationality of the same State."  This formula has the 
advantage that it guarantees the involvement of Commissioners from all the Member 
States, which promotes a feeling of belonging on the part of its citizens.  It has the 
disadvantage that in the enlarged Union there might be so many Commissioners that they 
become anonymous, the College will lose its homogeneity and some Commissioners will 
be left without relev3.nt duties, or the duties now performed by the Commission will be split 
unnecessarily.  These disadvantages may be offset by systems for strengthening the 
homogeneity of the College, reinforcing the role of its President and revising the system of 
appointing and censuring Members of the College.  The other option is a College made up 
of a limited number of Commissioners corresponding to the number of really necessary 
portfolios (between 12 and  15). 
/t The thinking behind that option would be to restore the original character of the College as 
a homogeneous whole, made up of personalities who are clearly identifiable by the public 
without being associated with specific countries. 
- Control of the Commission: Some Members have said they are in favour of increasing 
control of the Commission, both by the EP and by the Council.  Some have put forward 
the possibility of individual censure of Commissioners. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Consideration of thE! formulae which affect the Commission's exclusive right to initiate 
legislation (sunset c:lause), and its consequences. 
- Search for  solutions to the committee procedure question, at least adopting provisional 
criteria so that the Conference can later decide on the practicalities. 
- Consideration of thE!  options as regards composition, decision-making system, 
appointment and political control of the Commission, so that it can play its role 
efficiently and legitimately in an enlarged Union.  With regard to the voting system in the 
College, the current system of representing the population already prevents the 
10 Commissioners 1·rom the most populated countries from adopting a decision by a 
simple majority.  This raises the problem of the decision-making system in the College, 
especially in view of the forthcoming enlargement.  This subject has not been discussed in 
the Group. 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES 
A.  Basic points 
Court of Justice. The ·~reat majority are in favour of retaining its functions.  With regard to its 
possible participation in Titles V and VI, see corresponding topics. 
Court of Auditors. Tho Group agrees to look into ways of increasing its control over Union 
matters which so require, specifically with regard to combating fraud. 
Committee of the Regions. Consideration will be given to the possibility of widening the 
scope of its consultative powers and of providing it with specific administrative infrastructure. Economic and Social Committee. Its situation will be studied in the light of the above. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
Is it necessary to consider other factors linked with these institutions and bodies in the light of 
the reports submitted by each of them? TOPIC 4. THE CITIZEN AND THE UNION- PART 1 
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 
A.  Basic points 
- The rights of the ciitizen 
The Group notes that introduction into the TEU of the principle of citizenship of the Union 
by Article B, third in•jent, its development in Articles 8 to Be,  and  confirmation in 
Article F(2) of the gHneral principle of respect by the Union for fundamental rights were 
intended as a response to the need to involve citizens more closely in the process of 
European construction.  However, it  recognizes at the same time that this purpose was 
viewed differently in  the various Member States: while in most of them the concept of 
citizenship increased the feeling of belonging to the Union, in some, by contrast, there 
was a failure to put across the idea that citizenship of the Union is not intended to replace 
national citizenship but actually to complement it.  In some cases the perception has been 
precisely the oppos1te, and in societies where this occurs there is undoubtedly a need to 
make a special effort to explain the facts. 
It is logical that this variety of situations should be reflected in the Group's attitudes. 
- There is a tendency by the majority to regard European citizenship as an essential aspect 
of making the Treat{ acceptable to European public opinion, and they therefore strongly 
support its development in two ways: 
Firstly, by means of deepening  the specific rights of European citizens already included 
in the Treaty (achie•;ing unrestricted freedom of movement and residence, completing 
diplomatic and com:.ular protection in third countries) and the inclusion of new rights (see 
below}, and also through reform and unification of the legal bases relating to citizenship, 
which are currently subject to excessively complex and disparate procedures (national 
ratifications). 
The other type of ac:tion to be taken in this area, according to the majority view, consists in 
spelling out the general principle of respect for fundamental rights laid down in 
Article F(2) and mal<ing it more workable. 
20 It is generally felt within the Group that during the current process of European 
construction, and above all in the run-up to enlargement, there is an urgent need to 
ensure full observance of fundamental rights, both in relations between the Union and the 
Member States and between States and individuals.  There is therefore consensus within 
the Group on the nE!ed to insert an Article into the Treaty providing for the suspension of 
its rights or even thB  expulsion of a Member State which infringes fundamental human 
rights or basic democratic principles.  There was also a suggestion that it would be 
appropriate to require that every applicant country first accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and all its Protocols. 
With regard to the content of the rights in question, the following were mentioned: 
* 
* 
express condemnation of racism and xenophobia by means of an analogous 
provision to the one proposed in  1991  by the European Parliament 
general clause prohibiting discrimination (in addition to the one prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 6) on grounds of gender, religion, 
opinion, sexual preferences, etc.  In  the opinion of some, the principle of equality 
between women and men should have general application and not be restricted as 
currently to the Bconomic sphere (Article 119); it should also be worded in a positive 
way in the Treaty and not simply as the result of a ban on discrimination. 
There was general support for the amendments listed in the two previous subparagraphs; 
the same does not apply to the following, at least on a first reading: 
* 
* 
* 
Prohibition of t1:J1~ death penalty. 
Protection of minorities. 
Socio-economic rights: specifically, inclusion in the Treaty of the content of the 
European Social Charter.  Some representatives pointed out the disadvantages which 
this possibility entailed because of its legal and economic consequences, and one was 
fundamentally opposed. 
21 .. 
.. 
Employment and quality of the environment 
(See topic 8,  Policies.) 
Some members put forward the idea of a European voluntary service, or "Peace 
Corps", for humanitarian action. 
As regards the way in which such rights might be embodied in the Treaty, two possibilities 
were considered: 
.. 
.. 
The Union, if it takes on legal personality, or the Community at any rate, would have to 
accede to the E.uropean Convention on Human Rights.  It should be noted here that 
the Court of Justice has been asked for an opinion, and it was pointed out that if the 
opinion were negative it would be necessary to amend the Treaty to overcome the 
legal obstacle quoted by the Court. 
Independently of the above, some members pointed out the advantages of including a 
Bill of Rights in lhe Treaty, either in the enacting terms or an annex, or in the 
preamble.  With the aim of being able to take a decision on such a list at the 
appropriate time·, it was agreed that the representatives of the Member States would 
send the General Secretariat of the Council an account of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by tl1eir respective constitutional provisions, which would serve as a basis 
for a comparative study. 
From the point of vi,3w of individual protection, it was clear that only accession by the 
Community to the European Convention and inclusion of a bill of rights in the enacting 
terms would confer a full guarantee, either by the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts in 
the first case, or only by the Luxembourg Court in the second. 
- In response to the majority view, some members point out that adoption of European 
citizenship is perceived as a threat to national identity in some Member States, and that, 
unless that perception is corrected, they do not think it appropriate to develop either the 
content or essence of the concept.  They also regard Community accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights as unnecessary and, furthermore, do not see the 
usefulness of including a Charter of Human Rights 
22 in the Treaty, since all the Member States already guarantee them in their territory. 
Among those who support this view, some would however accept a Bill of Rights in the 
preamble to the Treaty or are in favour of the Treaty incorporating a citizen's right to 
information. 
- Transparency 
The Group agrees on the need to make Union affairs more accessible and 
comprehensible to the general public.  The concept of "transparency" serves that purpose 
and covers differenl aspects: the principles of proximity and subsidiarity: "who does 
what", both in the n?lationship between the Union and the Member States (see Topic 8) 
and in the workings of the institutions.  In this context, the Group is examining possible 
simplification and ,clarification of the workings of the institutions (see Topic 3) and 
recommends that the powers and institutions of the Union employ better publicity, 
information and co,nsultation methods, paying special attention to national Parliaments. 
The Group feels thE<re should be more advance notice of Commission proposals and 
applauds the practice of issuing "Green Papers" while deploring the excessive use of 
interinstitutional aqreements to the extent that they are not transparent.  Changes in the 
Council's organization and working methods will have to take into account, inter alia, the 
aim of greater transparency.  Here, in addition to the question concerning the publicity of 
the Council activity discussed in topic 3, the Group recommends allowing individuals more 
information and gmater access to documents and improving the quality of  legislative 
texts. 
The Group also feels as a general rule that, as far as possible, the actual text of the 
Treaty must be simplified to make it accessible to members of the public interested in 
reading and studying it.  It has therefore requested an opinion from the Council Secretariat 
on the possibilities for simplifying and clarifying the text of the Treaty without altering its 
content, as a preliminary exercise to the Conference which is to decide on reforming it. 
Some members have mentioned the possibility of holding a referendum at Union level on 
certain matters of gt?neral interest, as a transparency measure which could also help to 
strengthen the idea of "belonging". 
23 B.  Areas for reflection 
- Does European citizenship undermine or help to reinforce the national identity of 
Europeans?  Study in depth and prepare an explanation in clear language which citizens 
can understand. 
- Content of the  right~:; attaching to European citizenship: identification of options. 
- The Union and the European Convention on  Human Rights: options. 
- Transparency: adoption of a position on  the preliminary report of the Council General 
Secretariat on possrble consolidation of the Treaty. 
- Possible new initiatives for a better understanding of the views of European citizens on 
Community construction. 
- European referendum? Under what circumstances? TOPIC 5. THE CITIZEN AND THE UNION- PART 2 
AtL~REA  OF FREEDOM AND SECURITY 
A.  Basic points 
- The Group is in agn:!ement that its report must give priority attention to strengthening the 
internal security of the Union, as stipulated by the Cannes European Council. 
- The Group considers that there is a clear demand on the part of the public for greater 
security for citizens within the Union in the face of phenomena such as economically-
motivated organized crime (drug trafficking, etc.) and terrorism.  Those members believe 
that, in the context of a single market and an open society, the State, acting in isolation, 
cannot fully guarantee the internal security of its citizens since such phenomena clearly 
have an international dimension.  For those members there is an obvious contradiction 
between the supranational organization of such crime and the national character of the 
main instruments used to combat it, which explains their limited effectiveness. 
- Citizens are also calling for better handling of the challenge posed to the Union by the 
growing migratory pressures to which it is subject; here the size of the problem 
demands common management. 
- The prospect of forthcoming enlargement brings about a qualitative change in the need 
to guarantee the int·3rnal security of citizens of the Union more effectively. 
- In view of these initial considerations, the Group has analysed the provisions and 
operation of Title VI  of the Treaty: 
All members are in  agreement that the magnitude of the challenges is not matched by the 
results achieved in response to them.  They differ, however, in their analysis of the 
causes of this lack of results and on the method of achieving further progress. * 
* 
A large majority feels that the provisions of this Title are inappropiate.  They see its 
operation as clearly defective, as stated in the reports by the Commission and the 
European Parliament on the operation of the Treaty.  Like the Commission and the 
European Parliament, they feel that objectives (inasmuch as Article K.1  simply 
mentions areas of common interest) and a timetable for achieving them are lacking. 
They also consider its instruments to be inappropiate, in that they seem to have been 
copied from TitlE! V,  although the subject matter is very different: extPrnal policy rarely 
involves laying clown laws and requires flexibility of action, whereas matters relating to 
the security of citizens require legal protection and therefore a legislative framework. 
A true institutional driving mechanism is lacking. 
In the view of these members, it is necessary to bring this Title of the Treaty, at least 
partially, into th•3 Community sphere, bringing the institutions into play, using the 
Community's le~Jislative instruments (Commission's right of initiative, control by the EP 
and the Court o1  Justice, better use of the majority rule, without prejudice to the 
continued use of unanimity - at least for a certain length of time - in particularly 
sensitive areas) and going beyond the current phase of intergovernmental 
cooperation.  Many of those members identify matters relating to aliens as an area 
which must be brought within the Community sphere: immigration policy, asylum 
(although not of course between Union citizens), controls at external frontiers, etc. 
The areas of police cooperation and judicial cooperation on both civil and criminal 
matters must be developed, in their view, by means of closer intergovernmental 
cooperation, at least for a certain period.  Meanwhile, political crimes should no longer 
be allowed as an exception to the rules on extradition between Member States of the 
European Union.  Similarly, the procedure provided for in Article K.9 ("passerelle") 
should be simplified. 
Some members, on the other hand, attribute the imperfections of this Title solely to the 
lack of adequatE! experience and political will and to over-complex structures, but 
believe that separation of the pillars is essential for intergovernmental management of 
matters linked with national sovereignty.  They do not, however, rule out methods of 
strengthening cooperation, such as the abolition of one or more of the current  group 
layers. 
The Group is in agreement regarding this last requirement and some members believe 
there is a need to strengthen the Council General Secretariat in these areas. - Lastly, the Group considered whether to bring Schengen into the acquis communautaire 
by means of a variable geometry arrangement, of the "opting in" kind, which did not meet 
with any opposition in principle at this stage. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Give further considmation to a clearer definition of the objectives of Title VI. 
- Pinpoint more precisely options for the necessary development of public security within 
the Union: 
Flesh out the option of bringing part oi this area under the Community.  How much ought 
to be dealt with by rneans of common policies?  What should be the role of the 
institutions?  How should specific procedures for this Title be differentiated within the 
Community: right of initiative, decision-making arrangements, role of the European 
Parliament and the Court?  How should greater cooperation be achieved in areas not 
brought under comrnon policies (police and judicial cooperation, areas to be addressed as 
a matter of priorityr'  Is it possible to distinguish between treatment of arrangements for 
aliens and the external side of these matters generally, to be brought within a Community 
framework, and that of the internal aspects, where greater intergovernmental cooperation 
would be the rule? 
Flesh out the alternative option:  Leave things as they stand?  Any progress which would 
make the intergovernmental method more effective?  Any scope for overcoming the risk of 
paralysis arising from the system of conventions negotiated by consensus and subject to 
ratification in each Member State?  More flexible "passerelles"?  Less complex 
management arrannements for Title VI?  Find common ground between the two options. 
- A Community statute for all legally resident third-country nationals?  Are a common 
immigration policy and common handling of the external side of Title VI generally to be 
regarded as a prerequisite? 
27 TOPIC 6.  UNION FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
PART 1.  THE UNION'S EXTERNAL ACTION 
A.  Basic points 
- The Group points out that the new situation in Europe poses new challenges for the 
Union's external dimension and it acknowledges shortcomings in the operation of Title V 
and problems of a lack of overall consistency in coping with the new challenges.  Where 
the Group is not agreed, on the other hand, is on a common assessment of the causes of 
such shortcomings and problems.  A few consider that this is due merely to teething 
troubles with a nove1l part of the Treaty, others that political will is lacking and attitudes 
hidebound, while the majority also see a structural problem of a mismatch between 
ambitious, albeit somewhat vague, objectives and inadequate instruments for achieving 
them. 
- The decision on the next enlargement is a response to the new external challenges but it 
in turn poses a challenge to the Union.  Enlargement will make for political stability and 
security for the people of Europe but it entails a qualitative change for the Union's internal 
and external aspects, which needs to be prepared for by clarifying objectives and 
strengthening instruments for the Union's external action. 
- As regards the obje,ctives of external action, some members have highlighted the need 
for greater consistE!ncy in all aspects of external action so that the Union's political weight 
matches its economic strength.  Some members have pointed here to a readily 
discernible distinction between two kinds of Union external action: one working well and 
the other not.  The first is the external dimension of Community policies and the second 
the CFSP.  Many members see the real problem with the CFSP as lying in the separation 
between the Union'B external political dimension and its external economic dimension. 
They have emphasized the lack of consistency and coordination between the first and 
second pillars and the paradoxical situation whereby matters of great moment with far-
reaching economic implications, both for the Member States and for their citizens are 
decided successfully by a qualified majority under the first pillar, whereas others of less 
substance and consequence 
2? require a consensus under the CFSP.  There are those who point to the risk of spillover 
from the second pillar to the first, which could lead to a shrinkage of the acquis.  In view of 
the interdependent and global nature of the present-day world, many members call for a 
comprehensive approach to overcome inconsistencies between the external dimension of 
the Community and foreign policy proper.  Some consider that a logical solution would be 
to dispense with the· pillar structure, but retain specific proposal, decision-making and 
implementation procedures within the Community pillar (following the EMU example). 
Others see a solution in greater cooperation between pillars, with the pillar structure 
retained.  That need for greater consistency should also inform preparations for Council 
proceedings, with a clearer relationship between Coreper and the Political Committee. 
- Some members seok a more specific statement of the Union's fundamental interests, as 
referred to in Article J.1 (2), and it has been proposed that they be defined by geographical 
areas.  Other members think the objectives should go into ideas such as solidarity 
between Member States and the upholding and defence of human rights and democracy. 
- As regards instruments, first of all several members think the Union should be given 
international legal personality. 
- The Group is agreed that an analysis, forecasting, planning and proposal unit or body 
should be set up for  the common foreign policy.  In principle, reform of the Treaties would 
not necessarily be required in order to set one up. 
As regards its composition and location, there are basically two options under 
discussion, both of which involve embodiment of the CFSP in the figurehead of a "Mr or 
Ms CFSP": 
.. 
.. 
Some advocate. locating the unit at the General Secretariat of the Council, with its 
facilities strengthened and the Secretary-General raised in rank to ministerial level. 
Those in favour of this option point to the merit of abiding by the present institutional 
framework by not creating any new bodies, and highlight the desirability of placing the 
unit at the Coun:il on account of the central role played by States within the CFSP. 
The other option is to create a new figure, a High Permanent Representative for 
CFSP, appointed by the European Council, 
29 ranking at least on a par with a Minister, to conduct Union's external political affairs 
and represent it.  That person would chair the Political Committee and would be in 
charge of the planning and analysis unit.  In practice, the unit would be a "tripartite" 
body, made up of the Member States, the Council and the Commission.  (The 
presence of WEU representatives has even been suggested).  However, this 
arrangement needs to be worked out in more detail since, as it stands, it does not 
ensure consistency between external Community policy and the CFSP and may give 
rise to a dichotomy or clash of responsibilities with the Council Presidency. 
In any event, the majority of the Group think the Commission should be involved with 
planning and analysis work in the interests of the necessary consistency in all aspects of 
the Union's external action.  A majority of the Group also oppose the creation of a new 
institution to handle the CFSP, preferring to look into options within the present 
institutional framework. 
One question to be settled is whether the unit, however composed, should or should not 
have a dual role: analysis and planning, on the one hand, and initiative-taking, on the 
other.  The difficulty of separating analysis, planning and proposal in the CFSP is a factor 
in favour of assigning a right of initiative.  The factor which militates against it is the 
possible risk of con1usion of responsibilities, which can easily be avoided if a "tripartite" 
arrangement is adopted. 
- On decision-making procedures, some see the fact that qualified-majority voting is not 
used as one of the Gauses of the CFSP's ineffectiveness.  Others take the view that 
consensus and a VE!tO are essential in  matters which lie so close to the heart of national 
sovereignty.  As intormediate options, the Group explored ad  hoc arrangements such as 
"consensus bar one", a "super-qualified majority" or "positive abstention" in order to 
overcome the risk of deadlock in a field in which the Union needs to be able to take 
decisions. 
- As regards implem•:lntation of the CFSP, two possible approaches are identified in the 
Group, the first being to explore arrangements maintaining the central role of the 
Presidency in external representation and implementation of the CFSP.  This is the 
present approach under the Treaty, although enlargement and the growing external 
responsibilities of the Union make it advisable, if that approach is to 
JO continue, to considE!r ways of giving the Presidency a higher profile and greater 
permanency.  Two possibilities are conceivable here: a team Presidency (see topic 3) 
and/or an elected presidency.  The alternative approach is to assign such implementation 
tasks to an ad hoc !body ("Mr or Ms CFSP"), whether the High Representative for CFSP 
mentioned earlier or any other arrangement in which the Member States and institutions 
have confidence.  Some have pointed out that there is already a figure enjoying such 
confidence, namely the President of the Commission, who is appointed by the European 
Council and approv13d by the European Parliament. 
- As regards the financing of the CFSP, there is a consensus in the Group on the need to 
establish specific procedures ensuring availability of the necessary funds for rapid action 
when required.  In any event, solidarity in general and financial solidarity in particular 
should underlie financing arrangements and therefore be applicable to possible cases of 
"positive abstention·· or "opting out".  The view is taken by a broad majority that the CFSP 
should be financed out of the Community budget. 
- Role of the European Parliament: the majority view is that the EP cannot play the same 
role in this field as for Community legislation.  Some members think it advisable to build 
on the present Treaty provisions, centring on the European Parliament's right to be 
informed in this respect.  Others think it necessary to go further and involve Parliament 
more closely in detE!rmining the broad lines of the CFSP and in handling the Union's 
external political affairs by means of arrangements ensuring confidentiality.  A few 
members are reluctant to see any increase in  Parliament's role and several point out that 
the EP should not under any circumstances be given powers not even enjoyed by national 
parliaments in an area in which governments conduct their foreign policy without prior 
authorization by parliament, except in cases distinguished by their extreme gravity. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Give further considmation to consistency in the Union's external action: pillar structure or 
merely specific procedures? 
- Look into the question of legal personality for the Union. 
Jr - Determine in greater depth the CFSP's objectives and fundamental interests. 
- Instruments: structural options to fulfil the role of analysis, planning and preparation for 
the CFSP.  Decision-making procedures: various ad hoc options. Implementation: role of 
the Presidency, of tl1e institutions and of ad hoc bodies. 
- Financing: options. 
- Role of the European Parliament. 
- Consideration of gmater interinstitutional cooperation: The point is that at each stage of 
the framing of the CFSP (formulation, decision-making and implementation) it is 
necessary to identify where the seat of power lies.  Unlike the Community legislative 
process, for the CFSP it is not easy to draw a clear distinction between those three stages 
and it is therefore pointless to adopt a design based on a consecutive division of labour 
with the proposal function falling to the Commission, decision-making to the Council and 
implementation to both.  That fact should prompt the Group to seek solutions. 
J2 TOPIC 7.  UNION FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
BART 2.  SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
A.  Basic points 
- The security and defence challenges in Europe and its immediate vicinity and the global 
challenges to European territorial integrity cannot be met by Member States of the Union 
in isolation, nor even by those with the strongest military forces.  They therefore require a 
collective respons~~. 
- The end of the cold war has meant changes in the issues facing defence. Nowadays, 
together with the conventional aspect of defence as a safeguard for territorial integrity, 
increasing significance attaches to a new aspect centring around internal civil strife, 
protection of minorilies, human rights violations, ecological disaster risks, irresponsible 
use of new technology, etc. 
- The next enlargem,~nt will bring a quantitative and qualitative change in the Union's 
security and defence.  It is a response motivated by the search for greater stability and 
security, but it will also constitute a challenge requiring the establishment of relationships 
of mutual stability at the new borders of the enlarged Union. 
- As regards territorial defence, the Group is agreed on the vital importance of NATO's 
role. The message must be pressed home to our allies that the Atlantic Alliance is and will 
remain an essential component of collective security in Europe.  It is for the WEU to 
develop a Europea11 security and defence identity progressively as the European pillar 
of NATO.  That European defence identity also needs to be able to respond to the new 
aspect of defence through the tasks defined in the Petersberg Declaration. 
- The principle of national sovereignty remains the basic point of reference in defence 
matters and so consensus has to be the rule in this field.  However, some flexibility 
should be brought to bear on that principle by applying the rule that no-one can be obliged 
to take part in military action by the Union, nor can anyone prevent such action by a 
majority group of  M1~mber States.  In that event, any  States not participating should show 
solidarity with the action taken, both financially and politically. 
J3 - EU-WEU relations 
A minority school of thought in the Group holds continued autonomy for the WEU to be 
the only option  pos~:ible for the foreseeable future since it allows defence matters to be 
kept clearly within tt1e intergovernmental sphere, avoids weakening the commitments 
entered into within the WEU and NATO (Article V guarantee) and enables full allowance 
to be made for the diversity of national positions and for the mismatch between Union and 
WEU membership.  Such continued autonomy for the WEU in relation to the Union should 
be accompanied by greater complementarity between the two politically (parallel EU-WEU 
summits), administratively (harmonization of Presidencies and Secretariats) and 
operationally (thrOU!~h the strengthening of the WEU's capabilities).  (It should be pointed 
out, moreover, that such complementarity is endorsed by a majority of the personal 
representatives). 
A number of memb43rs, chiefly representing countries which are not members of the WEU, 
do not think a merg1?r feasible, at any rate not in the foreseeable future.  The reason for 
this is that their countries' special position does not allow them to take on all of the 
obligations under the Brussels Treaty, in particular the automatic territorial guarantee in 
Article V.  On the other hand, they do seem prepared to give favourable consideration to 
participation in the Petersberg tasks. 
Lastly, a majority of members see the way to the establishment of a genuine European 
security and defence identity as lying in the progressive integration of the WEU into the 
EU with its two potential aspects: territorial defence under the Article V guarantee and the 
new aspect of defence (Petersberg tasks).  Such a merger follows logically from the 
Treaty and is the only means of achieving consistency between political union, foreign 
policy and defence.  In their view, the progressive development of a defence dimension to 
the Union with a m~.;tual assistance guarantee would reflect all-round solidarity between 
Union members, which cannot be confined to the economic sphere alone.  With that 
prospect of eventual merger between the EU and the WEU in view, some members see a 
need to establish a timetable with a target date for full merger, while others think it 
sufficient to set a date for discussing a final merger in future and determining 
arrangements for it.  For those members in favour of merger it is important for the 
Conference to establish legal and political links between the two organizations as well as 
a minimum set of operational resources enabling the WEU to act as the EU's military 
arm in the field of crisis management, crisis prevention and peace-keeping. Some members have mooted intermediate arrangements between autonomy and 
integration, at least until such time as integration is achieved, through the creation of a 
bond making the WEU subordinate to the EU, either by amending Article J.4(2) of the 
Treaty or by means of a binding agreement whereby the WEU would implement EU 
decisions with defence implications.  It has also been suggested that Petersberg task 
matters be included in the Treaty, while leaving the question of territorial defence for an 
annexed Protocol.  In this way it would be possible to make allowance, in the immediate 
future, for the special situation of certain States, which would thus have a temporary 
derogation or an "opt-iil", which some would like to see apply for a pre-established period. 
- Lastly, the question of cooperation regarding arms production and trade has been 
touched on and there has even been a suggestion that Article 223 of the EC Treaty be 
amended.  The Group has not gone into this in any detail. 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- Give further considmation to options for EU-WEU relations, in parallel with discussions 
under way in the WEU. 
- Look at solutions fo1'  EU decision-making procedures in security and defence matters: the 
need to reconcile respect for consensus with the Union's ability to act.  Positive 
abstention?  Different arrangements for solidarity, in the light of internal limitations? 
- Look at the Union's lack of symmetry in security and defence matters.  A variable 
geometry arrangement in this field?  Where must flexibility stop if it is to be compatible 
with collective security and the consistency of the European design? 
- Give further thought to a possible amendment of Article 223 and, in general, to all matters 
concerning a possible internal market for arms. , 
TOPIC 8: IINSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE UNION 
ACTS 
A.  Basic points 
- Hierarchy of acts 
In accordance with  the brief to examine the classification of Community acts with a view 
to the possibility of Gstablishing a hierarchy of acts, as stated in Declaration No 16 
annexed to the TELl, the Group has analyzed this question and  two positions have 
become apparent: 
On the one hand, there are those who favour establishing a hierarchy of Community acts 
consisting of three levels: constitutional acts, legislative acts and implementing acts.  This 
hierarchical system of classifying acts would make it possible to identify clearly "who does 
what" and thereby render matters simpler and more transparent.  The functions of each 
Institution would be clarified by such a system of Community Law sources: Treaties would 
require unanimity on the part of the Council and ratification by national Parliaments, while 
legislative acts would be adopted on a Commission proposal as a co-decision involving 
both the Council and the Parliament, and the Commission would be responsible for 
implementing provisions under Council and Parliament supervision. 
On the other hand,  there are those who are against incorporating this system in the 
Treaty, not because· it is illogical but because they feel either that it will introduce an 
unnecessary compl1cation or that it is based on the idea of separation of powers within a 
State and they do not want the Union to be subject to that kind of organization of powers. 
They maintain that the Union is "sui generis" and that the present system of Community 
Law sources (Regulations, Directives, Decisions and Recommendations) is better suited 
to its characteristics.  They also think that there are other ways of clarifying the functions 
of each of the Institutions while maintaining the balance between them.  In this context, a 
return to the original spirit of the Treaty and use of the Directive which is more in line with 
its actual purpose would bring clarification. - Implementation of acts: (Committee procedure) 
Those in favour of a.  hierarchy of acts make the point that, if adopted, it would resolve this 
issue which the interinstitutional "modus vivendi" of 20 December 1994 identified as one 
to be dealt with by the Conference. 
In any case, one trend in the Group is to abolish the present committee procedure system, 
which is already confused and complicated and will not survive beyond the next 
enlargement. 
Those taking the opposing view, which is to maintain the 1987 Committee Procedure 
Decision, stress that the Council is not, as some would have it, the  States' Chamber but 
the main Institution of the Union with legislative and executive powers which must be 
preserved.  They th1nk that abolishing the committee procedure and transferring executive 
powers to the Commission would alter the balance between the Institutions. 
In view of these twc opposing positions, some members of the Group favour a 
compromise approach and recommend simplifying the committee procedure by replacing 
it with a single proct~dure under which it would be up to the Commission, in consultation 
with national experts, to decide on implementing measures under the supervision of the 
Council and the EP.  in application of ordinary legislative procedures.  It has been pointed 
out in this connectic,n that opposition by three Member States within the Council should be 
sufficient to reject any given implementing measure. 
- Monitoring the implementation of acts 
Some members want the Commission to make full use of the powers conferred upon it by 
Article 171  regardin;;~ penalties for failure to comply with Community law. 
There is a suggestion that the EP's powers in this area should be strengthened by means 
of Investigative Committees which could convene the Authorities of the Member States. 
Other members propose allowing private individuals more effective means of action to 
appeal against failure to comply with Community legislation. 
37 - Distribution of powers and subsidiarity 
*  Catalogue of powers and Article 235: The Group is not in favour of incorporating a 
catalogue of the Union's powers in the Treaty and would prefer to maintain the system 
at present in the Treaty, which establishes the legal basis for the Community's actions 
and policies in each individual case.  It is therefore also in favour of maintaining 
Article 235 as the instrument for dealing with the changing nature of the Union.  Some 
members have suggested incorporating the EP assent requirement in Article 235. 
*  Subsidiarity: The Group stresses the importance of the principle of subsidiarity 
enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 3b of the Treaty and confirmed by an 
Interinstitutional Agreement.  Three positions have emerged within the Group on how 
this principle should be implemented: 
Most of the members think that subsidiarity is above all a behavioural dictate.  Two 
abuses need to be avoided when applying it: allowing it to remain an abstract principle 
without practical effect although the subject or the circumstances may require specific 
action by the Union, or turning it into an  instrument for systematically reducing the 
Union's powers.  If these are not avoided, either the Union would not be able to act or 
the result would be destruction of the acquis communautaire, thereby threatening not 
only the validity of the Community of Law but also, by extension, the maintenance of 
the Single  Mark1~t and other common policies.  These members therefore feel that the 
subsidiarity be applied in such a way as to provide guidance for the proper exercise of 
the powers shared out between the Community and the Member States, thereby 
eliminating abus.e in either direction.  For these reasons, those who adopt this view do 
not feel it is advisable to alter either the texts or the practice in this area. 
Some Member States, while agreeing with the above definition of subsidiarity and the 
idea that Article 3b should not be amended, nevertheless think it necessary to 
exercise more effective control over application of this principle.  They therefore 
propose going further than the present system of "ex-ante" control by the Commission 
or "ex-post" control by the Court of Justice and introducing political supervision by the 
national Parliaments or even through a new procedure for appealing to the Court. 
Other Members propose establishing 
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a new type of "ex-ante" control, either by incorporating a general "sunset clause" in 
Commission proposals or by obliging the Commission to consult a "High-level 
Parliamentary Advisory Committee" consisting of Members of the National Parliaments 
regarding the correct application of the principle of subsidiarity each time legislation is 
proposed.  The ·first of these practical suggestions has prompted doubts on the part of 
many members, who point out that the best Community acts are not those which are 
least discussed and think that such a limitation clause would affect the balance 
between the Institutions in that it would weaken the Commission's prerogative of 
proposal.  The point needs to be looked at in greater detail.  The second suggestion 
has not yet been discussed by the Group. 
Finally, one Member of the Group has suggested that the Edinburgh Declaration 
should be given the status of a Protocol and that a provision should be included in the 
Treaty to limit "ex-ante" any regulatory excesses and provide for more systematic use 
of clauses whictl expressly limit Community powers, as is at present the case with 
education, health and cultural affairs. 
The request by the Committee of the Regions to have active legal capacity to refer 
violations of the principle of subsidiarity within each Member State to the Court of 
Justice was unanimously opposed by the Group, precisely because the principle of 
subsidiarity means that questions relating to internal powers should be dealt with at 
national level within each Member State. 
Subsidiarity and sufficient means: It has been pointed out that there is a need to 
relate the application of the principle of subsidiarity to that of the principle of sufficient 
means.  The latter should not be interpreted as a mechanism which triggers automatic 
financing by the Community of every Community decision, but as meaning that before 
making any proposals, the Commission should apply the criterion of sufficient means 
in order to ascertain whether the decision proposed can rely upon the financing 
necessary to acnieve its economic effects from the Member States rather than from 
the Community l:>udget.  When a decision requires unanimity, the Commission need 
not take the place of each and all of the Member States in their estimates.  On the 
other hand, when a decision is to be taken by a qualified majority, the proposal should 
not be put forward if it is not possible to provide finance at Community level to deal 
with the effects which may result for those Member States which are in danger of 
finding themselves in a minority and are not able to oppose the majority decision (see 
below under "re!>ources"). 
J1 B.  Areas for reflection 
- In the section on challenges to be met, the Group agrees on the importance of 
maintaining the Community of Law as the main guarantee of Community integration and 
therefore of peace and prosperity in our countries.  The Group is therefore unanimous in 
wanting to maintain and develop the acquis communautaire and preserve the single 
institutional framework.  There should be a more detailed examination of the way acts 
should be  ~and  led in the section on the instruments available to the Union with a view to 
this common objective. 
- Hierarchy of acts: identify the options. 
- Committee procedure: identify the options. 
- Monitoring implementation: further analyze options and methods. 
- Subsidiarity: identify the options for practical procedures to ensure correct application of 
subsidiarity:  "ex-po~:t" and "ex-ante" procedures. 
RESOURCES 
A.  Basic points 
- The 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvements of the 
budgetary procedure provides for re-examination of these questions at the 1996 IGC. 
Among these quest1ons, the Group has analyzed the system of own resources, the 
possibility of a fifth resource, the multiannual financing programme, the budgetary 
procedure and the principle of necessary means (see above also). 
- Own resources: 
Most of the members were opposed in principle to parallel negotiations by the 1996 IGC of 
the next Financial Perspectives Agreement.  They point out that there is already another 
session planned for 1999, the year in which the present Financial Agreement expires.  All 
aspects of the system of resources should be examined at that time.  Any other course of 
action would unnecc?ssarily complicate the agenda for the 1996 Conference and run the 
risk of delaying the .:1genda to be pursued for Europe when the Conference has finished.  The Community has always adopted a stage-
by-stage approach and accumulating tasks for the 1996 IGC would lead to a general 
debate about the future of Europe which would prove unmanageable. 
Some members, however, point out the connection between the Conference, the 
Financial Agreement and enlargement.  They want to know "who will be paying for what" 
before going ahead not only with enlargement but also with ratification of the Conference 
itself. 
Leaving aside the question of the right moment for discussion of the system of own 
resources, some mombers already agree on the need to revise the system of 
contributions to Community budget revenue, either by establishing a new system of 
revenue which take.s account of the relative prosperity of the various Member States, or 
by reducing the lack of consistency between the EP's powers with regard to expenditure 
and its present very limited role in revenue arrangements, or by establishing a genuine 
Community system for obtaining resources, i.e. a system of taxes which will supersede 
the present provision of national contributions.  None of these proposals has found 
unanimous favour with the Group. 
- Multiannual financial programming: 
There is some support for incorporating this aspect in the Treaty.  A clear majority would 
prefer to keep it outside the main framework in the more flexible domain of 
interinstitutional agreements. 
- Budgetary procedure: 
In addition to the fairly general wish to simplify the procedure (abolition of one of the 
readings), the proposal made by some members to reduce the lack of consistency 
between the EP's budget powers with regard to expenditure and those with regard to 
revenue has already been mentioned.  In the case of expenditure, some members 
propose simplifying the procedure by removing the distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory e:(penditure.  Most members, are, however, against removing the 
CE/NCE distinction.  An intermediate position on improving the balance between the 
budget powers of the Council and of the Parliament would involve giving the latter some 
power to intervene in CE, perhaps in the form of a percentage. 
L(( - Principle of sufficitmt means: 
As already indicated in connection with the principle of subsidiarity, some members think 
that application of ttlis principle should lead to moderation in the production of legislative 
proposals by the CCtmmission where their implementation might impose on a Member 
State an economic burden  for which no funds have been allocated.  Some members, 
however, feel that ttlis principle is sufficiently enshrined in Article F(3), although the 
location of the Article means that its contents are not legally actionable.  Others have 
mentioned Article 201 a although that Article refers only to the Community budget.  A few 
members have pointed out that strengthening this principle would make it easier to accept 
the move from unanimity to a qualified majority on certain sensitive aspects of secondary 
legislation, particularly those which involve a high financial cost for the Member States. 
- Monitoring expenditure: 
A number of suggestions have been made here, e.g. strengthening the role of the Court of 
Auditors in the fight against fraud and establishing closer cooperation with national audit 
bodies.  There was also a suggestion that the Ecofin and Budget Council should have 
more control over the "spending" Councils, in particular the Agriculture Council, and the 
Commission should regularly evaluate the main items of expenditure (agriculture, 
structural funds). 
B.  Areas for reflection 
- More detailed discussion of a possible joint proposal by the Group on how to pursue the 
agenda for Europe: 1996 IGC, Financial Agreement, enlargement- consecutive or 
simultaneous treatment?  (see TOPIC 1 "Challenges, Principles and Objectives"). 
- Should the Group discuss guidelines for negotiating reform of the system of own 
resources in greater detail? 
- Budgetary procedure: role of the European Parliament.  Identify the options. 
- Principle of sufficient means: consider the possibility of strengthening this point in the 
Treaty together with  "ex-ante" procedures for practical application. POLICIES 
A.  Basic points 
- The general feeling within the Group is that the Community should try to do not more but 
better. 
- Concerr.ing EMU, the Group thinks that there is no reason to reconsider either the criteria 
or the timetable for a single currency.  The commitment is one agreed on by all and 
ratified by the national Parliaments and it is in the process of being implemented in 
accordance with what was agreed.  Some members simply raise the possibility of 
supplementing the Bxisting content so that there is a proper balance between the 
development of monetary integration and the corresponding economic and social 
integration of the Union. 
- The Group stresses the urgent need to meet the challenge of job creation, in  response to 
a pressing demand from Europe's citizens. 
Most of the members also think that the Union must strengthen the social content of the 
Treaty.  Although the Union sees no miraculous cure for unemployment, it cannot remain 
inactive in the face of this serious problem since its task is to coordinate and mobilize 
efforts in a common direction.  On the one hand, therefore, in addition to including 
economic and social rights in the text, the Treaty should incorporate practical provisions 
geared to maintaining a high level of employment in the Union.  These members also 
propose rewording  ,t~,rticle 1  03 to incorporate the idea of giving priority to employment.  As 
regards the organization and working methods of the Institutions, they propose setting up 
a High-Level Committee on Employment to ensure permanent supervision of the fmpact of 
Community policies on job creation; such supervision should moreover be one of the 
essential tasks of the Employment and Ecofin Councils of Ministers.  On the other hand, a 
considerable majority thinks it urgent to incorporate the Social Protocol in the Treaty.  It 
has also been suggested that a "social acceptability clause" be inserted in the Treaty 
obliging the Commission to evaluate its proposals in the light of social objectives. 
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One member rejects this line of argument outright.  He thinks that job creation is achieved 
not by more Community regulation but by less.  He feels that the real employment 
challenge comes from the global economy and that the Community's response should be 
deregulation and emphasis on greater competitiveness. 
The Group agrees that employment is not a sectoral policy but an objective which should 
be strengthened and also the result of a global policy.  It also points out that the Union's 
ability to achieve this objective will depend to a large extent on the general public's 
acceptance of the process and support for it. 
- Environment.  The Group thinks priority should be given to taking account of 
environmental aspects of Community policies.  Some members have made the following 
practical proposals: incorporate in the Treaty the agreements subsequently reached at the 
Rio Conference so that Community policies are geared to a sustainable development 
model; reference has also been made to the possibility of including the environment in 
Article 36 (restrictions on  imports) and Article 39 (objectives of the common agricultural 
policy) of the Treaty and to considering extending the possibilities offered to the Member 
States by Article 1  00a(4) for laying down higher national standards; more involvement of 
the EP through co-clecisions on these matters is also suggested.  These are matters to be 
looked at more closely. 
The Group stresses the pressure being brought by public opinion for greater respect for 
the limits imposed by the ecosystem. 
Some members have pointed to the need to state more clearly the priority objectives of 
the Union's environmental policy, which should be consistent with other sectoral policies, 
e.g. agriculture, etc., in terms of conserving environment. 
A few  members have pointed out the limits which should be imposed by application of the 
principle of sufficient means if the exceptions currently decided on unanimously were to 
be decided on by a qualified majority.  He also pointed out the quasi-constitutional nature 
of such exceptions in that they affect highly sensitive areas concerning the sovereignty of 
the Member States or have major financial implications at national level. • 
- New policies 
In accordance with Declaration No 1 annexed to the TEU, the Group has analyzed the 
possibility of including the spheres of energy, tourism and civil protection in common 
policies, and has reached the conclusion that it would probably be more appropriate in 
these spheres simply to envisage greater cooperation between the Member States.  One 
member rejects even this possibility and also suggests deleting point (t) from Article 3. 
Some members think it necessary to incorporate a provision in the Treaty dealing 
specifically with support for the outermost regions of Member States of the Union. 
Some members think it would be appropriate to introduce a provision relating to public 
service, which would include inter alia a definition of universal service. 
One member has suggested extending Article 113 to cover services. 
Other members have reiterated the need to revise Article 223 on the production of or 
trade in arms (see Topic 7). 
Finally, some members have noted that maintaining Article 235 will make it possible, 
when appropriate, to embark on new spheres of Community action while complying with 
the limits of the Treaty. 
- Impact of enlargement 
Under each headinu. the Group has analyzed the effect of enlargement, as the Union's 
response to the nevt challenges arising facing the continent of Europe, and its impact on 
the institutional system, the internal and external security of the Union, the need to 
preserve and stren£1then the Community of Law, the new dimension created for the 
Union's resources, Htc.  It is, however, clear that enlargement will also have a major 
impact on the content of the Community's policies. 
Above all, the Group agrees in stressing that enlargement must take place and must take 
place successfully.  To avoid enlargement or have it miscarry would create a serious crisis 
not only in the applk;ant countries but also in the present Union. • 
Who will be acceding to the Union when enlargement takes place?  The Group thinks that 
accession should bB open to all applicants wishing to accede who comply with the criteria 
laid down at the Copenhagen European Council.  Each case will be dealt with on its own 
merits.  However,  t~re reforms presently being studied by the Group are those necessary 
for the accession of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Malta, Cyprus and 
the Baltic States. 
When?  Once the Conference ras ended, negotiations will be launched with all applicants 
satisfying the criteria referred to above. 
How?  The next enlargement will have to combine a global approach to meet common 
demands with flexible adjustment structures which make it possible in each case to adopt 
an appropriate time scale for the process of full incorporation of applicants.  The idea of a 
time scale, which is a familiar one in Community thinking, will also make it possible to 
alleviate the burden of enlargement on resources and on the content of the common 
policies pursued by the present Union. 
The Group has not at present reached a united position on the question of whether 
common policies should or should not be revised in the light of enlargement and if so what 
the scope of such mvision should be.  This is not in fact one of the Group's tasks.  There 
is, however, agreement on the need to maintain the acquis communautaire and build on it 
(Articles B and N) as a basic principle for the present Member States and as a major 
guide for the applicant countries.  This should not prevent flexible application of the acquis 
by the applicant countries. 
In any case, most members of the Group are in favour of separating the Conference 
exercise from the study of the impact of enlargement in relation to possible revision of 
common policies, for the following three reasons: firstly, any revision of policies does not 
require amendment of their respective legal bases; secondly, the effect of enlargement on 
common policies will not be immediate but will be spread over time in accordance with the 
only  enlargement model which seems possible  for the majority  of  the next  set of 
applicants; finally, it is not appropriate to combine two such politically sensitive exercises. B. 
This has not prevented some members of the Group from stressing the link between the 
process of ratification of the Conference and discussion of the effects of enlargement on 
the various policies and on the financing of the Union. 
!feas for reflection 
- · Special consideration should be given to guidelines on employment and the environment, 
identifying the options for possible reforms of the Treaty, organizational proposals and 
working methods wl1ich could be implemented before the Conference. 
-!  New policies: identi'fy the most useful options. 
- The impact of enlar~~ement on common policies: To be dealt with after the Conference or 
1  in parallel with it? 
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